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ABSTRACT
AN INVESTIGATION INTO VACCINATION BEHAVIOR:
PARAMETRIZATION OF A SAMOAN VACCINE SCARE
by
Amanda Spink
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2015
Under the Supervision of Professor Gabriella Pinter
Vaccination behavior can be influenced by many factors. Some examples are vaccine
scares, evolutionary game theory, social learning such as media coverage, feedback
in the form of infectious cases, and herd immunity. We investigated a previously
published model that attempts to explain vaccination behavior based on a game
theoretic point of view. The model was applied to a large vaccine scare in the
country of Samoa, and a parameter estimation problem was solved for different risk
perception scenarios. It was found that the model fit best in the case of no social
learning and no feedback. However, adding in these factors did not compromise the
models’ accuracy. These results confirm that while social learning and feedback may
not completely describe vaccinating behavior they are important factors in
individuals’ decisions to vaccinate or not.
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11 Introduction
Disease has plagued the world since the dawn of time. Age old remedies and medicine
have been combating disease ever since. Vaccines, although a newer defense, have
helped manage the spread of disease. Still, not all people can or do take advantage
of vaccinations. Let us take an investigatory look into vaccinating behavior to help
understand this phenomenon. We shall specifically focus on the vaccinating behavior
with respect to the measles vaccine.
The measles is an RNA virus from the genus Morbillivirus of the family Paramyx-
oviridae. The virus is spread from skin to skin contact and through the air. The
virus can also remain in the air for hours. Measles has a contact rate of nine out of
ten, meaning for every ten people an infected person comes into contact with, nine
will contract the disease, making the disease highly contagious. Symptoms of measles
include fever, cough, and rash. It may take anywhere from seven to twenty-one days
to develop the traditional rash. Therefore, an individual can have the measles and
not show signs, which also leads to high infectious rates. Severe complications include
permanent brain damage, seizures, or death [7]. The seriousness of the disease led
John Enders to invent a vaccine and license it in 1963. Shortly after, in 1968, Maurice
Hilleman created an improved vaccine that is still used today [8].
Hilleman’s measles vaccine is usually given in combination with the mumps and
rubella vaccines, or more recently with the varicella vaccine. The abbreviation for the
measles, mumps, and rubella vaccine is MMR and MMRV when the varicella vaccine
is included. The vaccine works best in two doses. The first dose is 93% effective and
having two doses is approximately 97% effective. It is recommended to receive the
first dose at one year of age and the second dose at ages four to six. This leaves
children under one year of age susceptible. Also, those who have certain allergies,
are pregnant, or have diseases such as HIV/AIDS or cancer that weaken the immune
2system may not be able to get the MMR vaccine [9]. Those who are not able to get
the vaccine depend on herd immunity to stay protected from the disease [13].
Herd immunity is the concept that if enough of the population is immune, a
disease cannot spread, hence an epidemic cannot occur. The immunities may be from
vaccination or contraction of the disease and recovery [13]. To better understand
herd immunity, the traditional SIR model (susceptible-infected-recovered) may be
used. The model is given by
ds
dt
= −βsi, (1.1)
di
dt
= βsi− γi, (1.2)
dr
dt
= γi, (1.3)
where β =
6205
13
[1] is the infection rate, and γ =
365
13
[1] is the recovery rate.
Furthermore, to prevent an epidemic, the epidemiological threshold, R0, must be less
that one [13], i.e.,
R0 =
βs(0)
γ + δ
< 1, (1.4)
where δ = 0.02 [1] is the mortality rate per year and s(0) is the fraction of the
population that is initially susceptible. Solving for s(0) yields
s(0) <
γ + δ
β
. (1.5)
Since
s(0) + i(0) + r(0) = 1, (1.6)
where i(0) = 0.0001 [1] is the fraction of the population that is initially infected and
r(0) is the fraction of the population that is vaccinated or immune, we can obtain how
3much of the population needs to be vaccinated to avoid the spread of the disease given
the vaccine’s effectiveness. With one dose of the MMR vaccine, the whole population
would need to be vaccinated and the disease would still spread. However with two
doses, approximately 97% of the population would need to be vaccinated to obtain
herd immunity and prevent an epidemic.
Reaching the herd immunity threshold of 97% is a difficult task. There are some
risks when getting the MMR vaccine, which may deter potential vaccinators. Risks
include: fever, rash, swelling, seizure, joint pain, low platelet count, allergic reactions,
deafness, or brain damage. The more severe side effects are quite rare. For example,
only one out of 30,000 doses experience low platelet count [9]. Some individuals may
view the risks of vaccination to be greater than the risks of contracting the disease.
These views determine vaccinating behavior.
2 Previous Research
Previous research shows how fragile vaccinating behavior can be. Parents want the
best for their children and choosing to vaccinate them or not is an important decision
that has become a controversial matter. Media coverage, the severity of the disease,
vaccine efficiencies, side effects, known infectious cases, herd immunity, and health
influence one’s vaccinating behavior [15], [1], [2].
2.1 Autism Vaccine Scare
In 1998, Andrew Wakefield et al. published a paper called “Ileal-lymphoid-nodular
hyperplasia, non-specific colitis, and pervasive developmental disorder in children.” In
this paper, Wakefield et al. claimed to have found a link between autism in children
and the MMR vaccine [15]. Upon further investigation, it was found that Wakefield
et al. had falsified data to get this result [3]. Brian Deer uncovered the truth and
4said
“Wakefield ’chiseled’ the data before him, falsifying medical histories of
children and essentially concocting a picture, which was the picture he
was contracted to find by lawyers hoping to sue vaccine manufacturers
and to create a vaccine scare.” [3].
As a result of this fraudulent paper, Wakefield lost his medical license in 2010 [3]
and the paper has been retracted [3],[4].
Unfortunately, the damage has been done. Wakefield’s false study has influenced
parents to boycott vaccinations, specifically MMR. To them, the risk of autism exceeds
the risk of getting the measles. This resulting vaccine scare has been going on for
more than a decade from Wakefield’s fraudulent research. I believe media coverage is
partially to blame. Most people have heard of the supposed link between MMR and
autism, however, they do not know that this study has been retracted, discredited,
and Wakefield has lost his medical license. The effects of this scare can be traced in
Table 2.1.
2.2 Vaccination Dilemma
In 2013, Cardillo et al. studied vaccination behavior in complex networks. They
used an SEIR (susceptible-exposed-infected-recovered) model with evolutionary game
theory components to model disease spreading. They wanted to examine the vaccine
behavior from flu season to flu season. The choice to get vaccinated depended on
the previous flu season. They found that when a flu vaccine was 100% effective,
individuals were more likely to vaccinate in the next flu season. However, if the
vaccine was not perfect, individuals were less likely to vaccinate and the number of
infected individuals therefore increased [2].
5Year MMR Coverage
1996 91.5 %
1997 90.8 %
1998 88.3 %
1999 87.6%
2000 87.4 %
2001 84.1 %
2002 81.8 %
2003 79.9%
2004 80.9%
2005 84.1 %
2006 85.2%
2007 84.6 %
2008 84.9 %
2009 88.2 %
2010 89.1%
2011 91.2 %
2012 92.3%
Table 2.1: Vaccination coverage in England [12] after the Wakefield vaccine scare.
2.3 England and Wales Vaccine Scare
In 2012, Chris Bauch and Samit Bhattacharyya wrote a paper called Evolutionary
Game Theory and Social Learning Can Determine How Vaccine Scares Unfold. They
analyzed the MMR coverage data produced from the aftermath of Wakefield’s vaccine
scare (see Table 2.1) and created a model using social learning and feedback. They
found that the model which does not consider either social learning or feedback is the
best fit if a particular risk evolution curve is assumed. Running the model includ-
ing social learning and feedback fits the data under all vaccine risk evolution curves.
Therefore, adding social learning and feedback improves the model. Predictive capa-
bilities of the model are also increased in the social learning and feedback case [1].
63 The Model
Bauch and Bhattacharyya’s model [1] is the main focus of this thesis. In the next
sections, the model is developed in detail, and we describe our efforts in recovering
their results. In Chapter 4 the model is applied to vaccinating behavior in Samoa
during a vaccine scare.
3.1 Evolutionary Game Theory
The model determined the evolutionary game theory component by considering indi-
viduals in the population and their strategies of being for vaccination or opposed to
vaccination. The model assumes that each individual samples others in the popula-
tion at some constant rate, s, and individuals will change strategies if they sample an
individual who is playing a strategy that is different than theirs and they are having
a higher payoff. The proportionality constant managing the changing of strategies
according to expected payoffs is θ. The payoff for vaccination is given by
Ev(t) = B(t)− cv(t), (3.1)
where cv represents the penalty to vaccinate and B represents having ideal health.
The payoff for opposing vaccination is given by
En(t) = B(t)− cimL(t), (3.2)
where ci is the penalty of getting infected, m is a proportionality constant character-
izing the chances of becoming infected, and L(t) is the number of known cases in the
population at some given time t. The difference of the payoffs in 3.1 and 3.2 is given
7by
∆Evn(t) = Ev(t)−En(t) = B(t)−cv(t)−(B(t)−cimL(t)) = −cv(t)+cimL(t). (3.3)
The proportion of individuals for vaccination, x(t), will switch their strategy to
become part of the proportion of non-vaccinators, 1− x(t), if the payoff of opposing
vaccination is greater than the payoff of being for vaccination, En(t) > Ev(t). Another
way to say this is if the penalty of vaccination is greater than the penalty of infection
times the number of cases times the chances of becoming infected, then vaccinators
will switch their strategy to being opposed to vaccination. Mathematically we can
represent the rate individuals for vaccination become opposed to vaccination by
 sθx(1− x)(cv − cimL) when ∆Env = cv − cimL > 00 when ∆Env = cv − cimL ≤ 0. (3.4)
(Note the t dependence is suppressed in the notation of equations 3.4 and 3.5.)
Similarly, the proportion of individuals opposed to vaccination will switch the
strategy they are playing to become part of the proportion of those individuals who
are for vaccinating when the payoff for vaccinating is greater than the payoff for
opposing vaccination, Ev(t) > En(t). In other words, if the penalty of infection
times the number of cases times the chances of becoming infected is greater than the
penalty of vaccination, non-vaccinators will switch their strategy of play to being for
vaccination. The rate that individuals opposed to vaccination become for vaccination
can be represented by
 sθx(1− x)(−cv + cimL) when ∆Evn = −cv + cimL > 00 when ∆Evn = −cv + cimL ≤ 0. (3.5)
Using these evolutionary game theory components the equations used to determine
8the proportion of vaccinators in the population can be generated [1].
3.2 Behavioral Modeling Equations
Four different equations were considered for the behavioral model in [1]. The full
behavioral model was obtained by subtracting 3.4 and 3.5 to yield the proportion of
those for vaccination, and is given by the equation
dx
dt
= sθx(1− x)(−cv(t) + cimL(t)), (3.6)
for t ≥ 0. The authors simplified this equation by using the substitution κ = sθcim
and ω = cv
mci
yielding the equation
dx
dt
= κx(1− x)(−ω(t) + L(t)). (3.7)
Thus, the full behavioral model factors in social learning, i.e., the proportion of
vaccinators depend on what portion plays this strategy in the group, and feedback,
i.e., the proportion of vaccinators depends on disease prevalence.
A similar model considered social learning in the absence of feedback. This model
was given by the equation
dx
dt
= x(1− x)(−ω(t)). (3.8)
Another model looked at feedback and no social learning, and is given by the
equation
x(t) = ρL(t)− ω(t). (3.9)
The last model determined the proportion of vaccinators without the presence of
9social learning or feedback. This equation is given by
x(t) = 1− ω(t). (3.10)
The models were run using five different risk evolution curves, ω(t). These risk
evolution curves were introduced because the ω term is comprised of cv(t), the per-
ceived penalty to vaccinate, which can change over time during a vaccine scare [1].
3.3 Risk Evolution Curves
The model equations use the function ω = ω(t) to represent how cv(t), the perceived
penalty to vaccinate, is changing over time. They assumed that ω(t) is constant until
a point in time where a vaccine scare occurs. Then, ω(t) increases linearly, plateaus
at a constant for some period of time, decreases linearly, and finally returns to the
original constant. Prior to the vaccine scare, ω(t) = ωpre. The length of the time
interval where ω(t) increases is denoted by Dincrease. The function ω(t) plateaus at a
level given by σωpre, where σ > 1, and Dmax denotes the length of the time interval
where ω(t) = σωpre. Finally, the function ω(t) decreases on the time interval of
Ddecrease [1].
The authors examined five risk evolution curves by manipulating the various pa-
rameters Dincrease, Dmax, and Ddecrease, which are listed below. Let ts denote the
starting time of the vaccine scare, Dinc = Dincrease, and Ddec = Ddecrease. The first
curve, ω1(t), sets both Dinc and Dmax equal to zero and is given by
ω1(t) =

ωpre if t < ts or t ≥ ts +Ddec
σωpre − ωpre
−Ddec (t− (ts +Ddec)) + ωpre if ts ≤ t < ts +Ddec.
(3.11)
10
Figure 3.1: Graph of the first risk evolution curve ω1.
The second curve, ω2(t), sets both Dinc and Ddec equal to zero and has the piece-
wise function of
ω2(t) =
 ωpre if t < ts or t ≥ ts +Dmaxσωpre if ts ≤ t < ts +Dmax. (3.12)
Figure 3.2: Graph of the second risk evolution curve ω2.
The third curve, ω3(t), sets Dinc equal to zero and is given by,
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ω3(t) =

ωpre if t < ts or t ≥ b
σωpre if ts ≤ t < ts +Dmax
σωpre − ωpre
−Ddec (t− b) + ωpre if ts +Dmax ≤ t < b
(3.13)
where b = ts +Dmax +Ddec.
Figure 3.3: Graph of the third risk evolution curve ω3.
The fourth curve, ω4(t), sets Ddec equal to zero, and has the piecewise function
ω4(t) =

ωpre if t < ts or t ≥ ts +Dinc +Dmax
σωpre − ωpre
Dinc
(t− ts) + ωpre if ts ≤ t < ts +Dinc
σωpre if ts +Dinc ≤ t < ts +Dinc +Dmax.
(3.14)
Figure 3.4: Graph of the fourth risk evolution curve ω4.
The fifth curve, ω5(t), follows the general form of ω(t), where it begins as a
constant, increases linearly, plateaus, decreases linearly, and returns to the starting
12
constant. No time intervals are equal to zero in ω5(t) and it is given by the following
piecewise function,
ω5(t) =

ωpre if t < ts or t ≥ c
σωpre − ωpre
Dinc
(t− ts) + ωpre if ts ≤ t < ts +Dinc
σωpre if ts +Dinc ≤ t < ts +Dinc +Dmax
σωpre − ωpre
−Ddec (t− c) + ωpre if ts +Dinc +Dmax ≤ t < c.
(3.15)
where c = ts +Dinc +Dmax +Ddec.
Figure 3.5: Graph of the fifth risk evolution curve ω5.
3.4 Model Replication
Bauch and Bhattacharyya’s model was replicated using their given parameters for
each of the risk evolution curves under three cases of social learning and feedback.
The case that included feedback but no social learning could not be replicated using
the given parameters due to issues that will be discussed in Section 5.2. Therefore
this case was omitted. Bauch’s parameters for each of the remaining cases are listed
in Tables 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4. For the case involving feedback, the disease incidence
data, L(t), is listed in Table 3.1 and the vaccine data coverage is listed in Table 2.1.
The solutions can be seen in Figures 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8.
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Year Cases
1996 112
1997 177
1998 56
1999 92
2000 100
2001 70
2002 319
2003 437
2004 188
2005 78
2006 740
2007 990
2008 1370
2009 1144
2010 380
2011 1087
2012 2030
2013 1843
Table 3.1: Known infectious cases of the measles in England and Wales [6].
Curve ωpre σ Dincrease Dmax Ddecrease κ
ω1 20 125.3202 0 0 8 9.18*10
−5
ω2 13.9864 100.3957 0 6.5 0 1.15*10
−4
ω3 16 100.608 0 4.9597 2.0389 1.05*10
−4
ω4 11 100.0988 3 4 0 1.94*10
−4
ω5 19.7 99.9456 3.4374 1.3556 1.6089 1.11*10
−4
Table 3.2: Bauch parameter values for social learning and feedback under the five
risk evolution curves [1].
Curve ωpre σ Dincrease Dmax Ddecrease
ω1 1.02*10
−3 200.0474 0 0 6.7691
ω2 5.95*10
−4 199.9999 0 6.1842 0
ω3 7.52*10
−4 200.0022 0 4.3253 1.0205
ω4 5.95*10
−4 200.0811 1 5 0
ω5 8.79*10
−4 199.9777 2.3671 1 2.4731
Table 3.3: Bauch parameter values for social learning and no feedback under the five
risk evolution curves [1].
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Curve ωpre σ Dincrease Dmax Ddecrease
ω1 0.1131 1.633 0 0 10
ω2 0.1197 1.4918 0 4.5 0
ω3 0.1 1.6674 0 6.6058 3.6602
ω4 0.0999 1.7289 6.6458 4.3542 0
ω5 0.0871 2.1803 5.6049 1 8.4948
Table 3.4: Bauch parameter values for no social learning and no feedback under the
five risk evolution curves [1].
Figure 3.6: Graph of social learning and feedback using Bauch’s parameters [1].
Figure 3.7: Graph of social learning and no feedback using Bauch’s parameters [1].
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Figure 3.8: Graph of no social learning and no feedback using Bauch’s parameters
[1].
4 Parametrization
To determine whether Bauch’s model for social learning and feedback could fit vac-
cination behavior in other cases, we investigated another vaccine scare under each of
the risk evolution curves for the different models.
4.1 Data Collection
To parametrize the model, various vaccine coverage data from around the world
was examined. The vaccinator equations model the number of vaccinators in the
population after a vaccine scare [1], hence a country whose vaccine coverage data
exemplified a large vaccine scare was sought after. The country of Samoa was chosen
as the coverage data showed a large vaccine scare in the population. See Table 4.1,
and Figure 4.1. Note that effects of the vaccine scare began in 2003, so it was assumed
to have started in 2002 [16]. It is unknown what caused the vaccine scare. Although,
it could be speculated that the lack of infectious cases, L(t), see Table 4.2, caused
16
the decrease of vaccinations as there were no cases of measles from 2000 to 2009 [5].
This data was interpolated from a graph from GIDEON Informatics Inc. [5].
Figure 4.1: Graph of the Samoan MMR vaccine coverage data.
4.2 Error
An ordinary differential equation solver (ode solver) from MATLAB R2014A was used
to solve each of the differential equations for the cases of social learning and feedback
and social learning with no feedback. The error of the model was calculated by taking
the sums of the squares of the difference between the fit of the model and the vaccine
coverage data divided by the data squared, with the requirement that all parameters
should be positive.
For the case of no social learning or feedback, the error was calculated by taking
the sums of the squares of the difference of the fit of the model and the data, with
the restriction that all parameters needed to be positive.
The error is used to determine the best fit model. The error for each curve can
be seen in Tables 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 as the RSSvac values.
17
Year MMR Vaccine Coverage
1995 96%
1996 96%
1997 99%
1998 99%
1999 91%
2000 93%
2001 92%
2002 99%
2003 62%
2004 25%
2005 57%
2006 54%
2007 63%
2008 45%
2009 49%
2010 61%
2011 67%
2012 85%
Table 4.1: Samoan measles vaccine coverage data [16].
Year Measles Cases
1995 0
1996 100
1997 0
1998 10
1999 5
2000 0
2001 0
2002 0
2003 0
2004 0
2005 0
2006 0
2007 0
2008 0
2009 0
2010 8
2011 0
2012 1
Table 4.2: Number of infectious cases of the measles in Samoa [5].
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4.3 Parameter Search and Solutions
An optimization routine, fminsearch, was run in MATLAB R2014a to determine the
values of ωpre, σ, Dincrease, Dmax, Ddecrease, in all cases, and κ in the case with both
social learning and feedback, that minimizes the error. The differential equations
were then solved using an ode solver in MATLAB with the newly found parameters
and their solutions were graphed. The results can be seen below.
Curve ωpre σ Dincrease Dmax Ddecrease κ
ω1 37.155 258.771 0 0 1.779 4.23*10
−4
ω2 33.361 818.736 0 1.301 0 7.915*10
−5
ω3 19.277 421.051 0 0.764 1.028 3.054*10
−4
ω4 142.481 153.876 0.017 1.091 0 1.114*10
−4
ω5 143.703 302.783 0.354 0.002 1.233 8.011*10
−5
Table 4.3: Samoan parameter values for social learning and feedback under the five
risk evolution curves.
Figure 4.2: Graph of the Samoan social learning and feedback models.
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Curve ωpre σ Dincrease Dmax Ddecrease
ω1 0.002 1303.837 0 0 1.798
ω2 0.004 541.807 0 1.314 0
ω3 0.004 560.490 0 1.307 0.008
ω4 5.361*10
−4 946.684 2.504*10−6 4.892 0
ω5 0.028 85.005 0.046 0.431 1.208
Table 4.4: Samoan parameter values for social learning and no feedback under the
five risk evolution curves.
Figure 4.3: Graph of the Samoan social learning and no feedback models.
Curve ωpre σ Dincrease Dmax Ddecrease
ω1 0.049 8.413 0 0 120.022
ω2 0.061 6.825 0 9.438 0
ω3 0.049 8.807 0 8.457 2.107
ω4 0.144 3.399 0.810 5.308 0
ω5 0.041 12.400 1.387 5.739 3.949
Table 4.5: Samoan parameter values for no social learning and no feedback under the
five risk evolution curves.
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Figure 4.4: Graph of the Samoan no social learning and no feedback models.
5 Results
The resulting best fit model for each case of the Samoan vaccine scare was not con-
sistent with previous research in all facets. Under no social learning or feedback the
findings were consistent, however it appears that social learning in the absence of
feedback is a better model than social learning and feedback for most ω risk evolu-
tion curves. Disease incidence data shows no increase after the substantial drop of
vaccinations in 2003 so it is no surprise that including feedback in the model does
not improve the fit. The reason vaccinations picked up again after 2003 must have
an alternate explanation.
To account for no disease incidence data, another parametrization was done to
see if we could better capture the data by incorporating another parameter, R. This
parameter is a regulation term or a compliance term, as individuals feel better when
they follow the rules or comply. Incorporating this term will imitate feedback since
for a period of nine years, no infectious cases were present in the population. The
resulting parameters and graph of solutions can be seen in Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1.
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Curve ωpre σ Dincrease Dmax Ddecrease κ R
ω1 38.135 278.981 0 0 1.665 4.228*10
−4 223.163
ω2 30.349 225.295 0 1.091 0 4.181*10
−4 105.125
ω3 10.973 402.969 0 0.675 1.046 6.283*10
−4 60.357
ω4 17.692 644.306 6.403*10
−9 1.571 0 1.640*10−4 50.699
ω5 55.290 323.846 0.326 0.452 0.515 1.872*10
−4 38.441
Table 5.1: Samoan parameter values for social learning and feedback with regulation
under the five risk evolution curves.
Figure 5.1: Graph of the Samoan social learning and feedback with regulation models.
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5.1 Akaike Information Criterion
To ensure that the Samoan models were a good fit and parsimonious, I evaluated the
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). The AIC numbers take into account the model’s
fit and the number of parameters used. While it may be possible to achieve a better
fit with more parameters the AIC ’penalizes’ the use of too many parameters and
aims at finding the most parsimonious model that is still a good fit [1].
The AIC value factors in the number of data points N and the number of param-
eters l. It is given by
AIC = −2ln(M) + 2l + (2l(l + 1))/(N − l − 1), (5.1)
where ln(M) is the natural logarithm and M is the likelihood estimator,
M = e−N/2/(2piRSSvac/N)N/2. (5.2)
The RSSvac term is the error. In all of these calculations, the number of data points,
N, was 18.
The best model with the social learning and feedback was under the ω1 curve
having an AIC value of −22.526858704651655. The ω2 curve AIC value was quite
close having an AIC score of −22.439183905732566. See Table 5.2.
Curve l RSSvac AIC
ω1 4 0.162938561236933 -22.526858704651655
ω2 4 0.163734141985326 -22.439183905732566
ω3 5 0.163676074463980 -18.522491727802098
ω4 5 0.161893555800294 -18.719596454847469
ω5 6 0.162464325641427 -14.019883855300751
Table 5.2: The RSSvac, l, and resulting AIC values under the five risk evolution
curves for both social learning and feedback.
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Under the social learning no feedback equation, the best model was the ω2 risk
evolution curve which had an AIC score of −25.848763435691843. The ω1 risk evolu-
tion curve was a close second with an AIC value of −25.822419181596707. See Table
5.3.
Curve l RSSvac AIC
ω1 3 0.163546883501212 -25.822419181596707
ω2 3 0.163307696318826 -25.848763435691843
ω3 4 0.163291668154259 -22.487892806207217
ω4 4 0.163674371657626 -22.445755915107529
ω5 5 0.159596319589236 -18.976842226865251
Table 5.3: The RSSvac, l, and resulting AIC values under the five risk evolution
curves for social learning and no feedback.
The best model for no social learning or feedback was ω5 with an AIC score of
−27.810271405563945. This model was also the best of all the cases. As seen in
Table 5.4, the rest of the models using the other ω curves were not very good. ω1 was
the worst model under no social learning or feedback having a positive AIC score of
10.299974236643381.
Curve l RSSvac AIC
ω1 3 0.3874 10.299974236643381
ω2 3 0.3320 -13.077784313658706
ω3 4 0.3144 -10.695587301527208
ω4 4 0.4193 -5.513016616337229
ω5 5 0.0977 -27.810271405563945
Table 5.4: The RSSvac, l, and resulting AIC values under the five risk evolution
curves for no social learning and no feedback.
The best model for social learning and feedback with regulation was under the ω2
risk evolution curve having an AIC value of −17.9699. Since this AIC value is larger
than the best AIC values from the other cases, it shows that adding in this regulation
term does not necessarily improve the model as we get penalized for having excess
parameters.
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Curve l RSSvac AIC
ω1 5 0.1742 -17.4035
ω2 5 0.1688 -17.9699
ω3 6 0.1694 -13.2726
ω4 6 0.1648 -13.7626
ω5 7 0.1640 -8.2889
Table 5.5: The RSSvac, l, and resulting AIC values under the five risk evolution
curves for social learning and feedback with regulation.
5.2 Limitations and Complications
The model has some limitations. This model only seems to apply to vaccine coverage
data that has a true vaccine scare. The model was not a good fit when applied to the
United States MMR vaccine coverage data so this route was quickly abandoned. The
U.S. data only fluctuates between 90% - 93% from 1996 to 2013 [11], hence there is
no vaccine scare present in the data.
When simulating the Bauch model complications arose. I was not able to repro-
duce Bauch and Bhattacharyya’s results from their parameters in the social learning
and feedback case. The model still appears to be a good fit, but it does not yield
the same results they got using the given values. In effort to correct this, I ran a
parametrization on that case. The resulting parameters were close to what they had
found. These results can be seen below in Table 5.6 and Figure 5.2. The social learn-
ing and no feedback case and no social learning and no feedback case were duplicated
without any difficulties. However, the feedback without social learning case was not
replicable from the given parameters. The parameters given in the supplemental in-
formation were inconsistent with the claims of the paper. For example, σ > 1 is a
condition, however, in the table of parameters, all of the σ values were 0.001, which
is clearly less than 1. Finally, when recreating the model, tables in the original paper
were mislabeled which made it challenging to decipher parameter values.
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Curve ωpre σ Dincrease Dmax Ddecrease κ
ω1 19.1469 123.0163 0 0 7.7963 9.64*10
−5
ω2 13.7971 95.8915 0 5.6103 0 1.30*10
−4
ω3 18.5281 107.0292 0 2.6977 2.2378 1.25*10
−4
ω4 17.4493 128.9044 0.5688 2.8721 0 1.41*10
−4
ω5 19.4281 121.3795 0.5636 1.6462 1.8429 1.46*10
−4
Table 5.6: Parameter estimation values for social learning and feedback under the
five risk evolution curves [1].
Figure 5.2: Graph of social learning and feedback under new parameters.
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5.3 Further Research
Further research should be done to examine vaccinating behavior. It would be of in-
terest to develop a model that could determine vaccinating behavior without needing
a true vaccine scare. Investigating vaccinating behavior of other preventable diseases,
such as the varicella vaccine or the human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccine, may be of
interest. The varicella vaccine is relatively new, 1995 [14], and in 2012 approximately
74.9% of those who have not had the chickenpox had two doses of the vaccine [10].
Also in 2012, only 53.8% of females and 20.8% of males had just one dose of the HPV
vaccine. Similarly, only 33.4% of females and 6.8% of males have had three or more
doses of the HPV vaccine [10]. Investigating why these percentages are so low would
be worthy of some research.
6 Concluding Remarks
The vaccinating behavior of individuals is a pertinent, controversial issue in our so-
ciety. I believe that vaccinating for preventable diseases should be an avid practice
for all of those who are able to vaccinate. It is our duty to maintain the threshold of
herd immunity to ensure that those who are not able to vaccinate are protected from
these preventable diseases.
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APPENDIX
SAMPLE CODES
Parameter estimation of social learning and feedback:
ω5
clear all
global X wcp
X=[1995 0 1996 100 1997 0 1998 10 1999 5 2000 0 2001 0 2002 0 2003 0
2004 0 2005 0 2006 0 2007 0 2008 0 2009 0 2010 8 2011 0 2012 1];
X=reshape(X,2,length(X)/2);
tspand=1998:2013;
wcp=[.96 .96 .99 .99 .91 .93 .92 .99 .62 .25 .57 .54 .63 .45 .49 .61
.67 .85];
t0=1995;
tf=2012;
x0=0.96;
%p0=[0.0001 80 200 1 2 1];
p0=[0.0001 75 200 1 2 1];
p=fminsearch(@errorSAMOA_SLF5,p0)
[t,v]=ode45(@vac_SAMOA_SLF5,[t0 tf],x0,[],p);
figure(1)
subplot(2,1,1)
plot(1995:2012,wcp,’r’)
axis([1995 2012 0 1])
hold on
plot(t,v,’b’)
legend(’vaccine coverage’, ’model5’)
MSLF5=sum((v(1:1+17)-wcp’).^2)/sum(wcp.^2)
p =
1.0e+02 *
Columns 1 through 3
0.000000801146833 1.437027625499285 3.027831138888646
Columns 4 through 6
0.003535918948115 0.000019157816402 0.012328834179898
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Error code of social learning and feedback:
ω5
function err=errorSAMOA_SLF5(p);
global X wcp
t0=1995;
tf=2012;
x0=0.96;
tspan=[t0:1:tf];
[t,v]=ode23s(@vac_SAMOA_SLF5,tspan,x0,[],p);
err=sum((v(1:1+17)-wcp’).^2)/sum(wcp.^2)+1000*(p(1)<0)+1000*(p(2)<0)+
1000*(p(3)<0)+1000*(p(4)<0)+1000*(p(5)<0)+1000*(p(6)<0);
Vaccinator code of social learning and feedback:
ω5
function vprime=vac_SAMOA_SLF5(t,v,p)
global X wcp
dx=p(1)*v*(1-v)*(-SAMOA_GENERIC1piecewiseSLF5(t,p(2:end))+interp1(X
(1,:),X(2,:),t));
vprime=dx;
Piecewise function:
ω5
function omega5=SAMOA_GENERIC1piecewiseSLF5(t,p);
global X wcp
wpre=p(1);
sigma=p(2);
Dinc=p(3);
Dmax=p(4);
Ddec=p(5);
if t<2002 | t>=2002+Dinc+Dmax+Ddec
omega5=wpre;
elseif 2002<=t & t<2002+Dinc
omega5=((((sigma*wpre)-wpre)/(Dinc))*(t-2002))+wpre;
elseif 2002+Dinc<=t & t<2002+Dinc+Dmax
omega5=sigma*wpre;
elseif 2002+Dinc+Dmax<=t & t<2002+Dinc+Dmax+Ddec
omega5=((((sigma*wpre)-wpre)/(-Ddec))*(t-(2002+Dinc+Dmax+Ddec)))+wpre;
end
